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Marco Bifulco
In Search of an Identity for Europe
[One should aim to be like the great amateurs
of the 1600s and 1700s. It would certainly be
very difficult. But the specialist loses his capa-
bility of understanding reality.]
The search for an identity is the search for an essence. The purpose of this
paper is to reveal “that something called Europe”. The task is difficult but
not impossible as long as one is convinced that it can be accomplished, just
as that “something called Greece” - tò Hellenikon - existed in that grouping
of enemy-and/or-lukewarm-friendly states that was classic Greece.
The term itself, “Europe,” originates in Greek mythology, but I won’t start
my research that far back. By Europe I mean modern Europe, in the form it
started to take on from the Protestant Reformation and the discovery of the
Americas onwards. In that historical period, Spain cast out first the Moors
and then the Jews from the Spanish peninsula while at the same time, it
started to conquer Latin America. It wasn’t a good start, rather an ill-
omened one, and a foreboding prelude to the tragedy of the modern age.
The conquest cleared the path for the expansion of European civilization
throughout the entire globe, while the expulsion of foreign peoples from
within its boundaries represented the definitive sunset of the idea of one
single humanity, in which different cultures and religions could live to-
gether in peace (the Roman Mediterranean myth). Europe was building its
own identity by discovering that which was different, inside and outside.
Curiously, just as Europe became aware of its civilizing mission, forces of
fragmentation erupted from its center: with Luther who, in 1517, posted his
incendiary theses onto the doors of the Wittenberg cathedral.Marco Bifulco
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Modern Europe proved to be a paradox right from the start. Its mission to
civilize all of humanity coincided with the disappearance of medieval re-
ligious unity and, with the beginning of the age of great nations, of the
dream of political unity. These are contradictions we still live with today
with the dawning of the opposite, albeit not incompatible, scenarios of
globalization and fragmentation.
Trying to figure out the identity of that paradox called European history,
where the rational and the irrational alternate with each other continuously,
is an attempt that should be undertaken with Socratic irony, with the
awareness that the subject is serious but also that theses of argumentation
are weak. I will here attempt to reconstruct a historical and philosophical
path through the ages with inevitable over-interpretations and manipula-
tions of reality. Coherence would imply silence.
This essay is written while Europe is living de facto through a constituent
phase, which the author believes to be one of the inevitable consequences
of the end of the cold war. For the first time in its history, Europe has the
possibility of forming a single political entity that is not based on the pre-
dominance of a single nation but on the recognition of interdependent rela-
tionships and on a common wealth of values. If we want this process to
succeed we will have to fully understand the origins we have in common so
that we can imagine a European society in the 21
st century.
The identities: a metaphysical reconstruction
That modernization was, at least in the beginning, a European process, is a
widely acknowledged fact. It therefore makes sense to start our research
with the Protestant Reformation and the discovery of America, as symbolic
moments that express the contradictions of modernity: this moment’s uni-
versal vocation in its recognition of individuality. Moreover, the religious
pluralism that is considered to be at the root of modern constitutionalism,
translated into a chronic conflict between the sovereignty of the prince and
that of God, a problem to which the Lutheran principle “cuius regio eius
religio” could only partially and temporarily solve. Hobbes clearly realized
the seriousness of the issue:In search of an Identity for Europe
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This difficulty hath not been of very great antiquity in the world. [...]
The difficulty therefore remaineth amongst, and troubleth those Cris-
tiana only, to whom is allowed to take for the sense of the Scripture
that which they make thereof, either by their own private interpreta-
tion, or by the interpretation of such as are not called thereunto by
public authority”
1.
Hobbes found in the idea of “Jesus is the Christ”, the only possibility of
recomposing the fracture between the religious and the political sphere, in
search for an “overlapping consensus” amongst all families of Christianity
(a successful formula that in the United States of today still carries a le-
gitimizing value). The contrast between political power and religious faith
paved the way for a new kind of legitimization of power, one based on in-
dividual rationality, which Hobbes himself coded in “a clear and specific
way”.
Legal positivism
Once Reformation has been identified as the historical event that allowed
the modern age to break in, it would be helpful to take a step back and ask
what its sacrifical victim, tradition, stands for. In order to do this, one needs
to start with the lesson of Thomas Aquinas, thanks to which Aristotle’s
thought (which had become accessible in its entirety thanks to contact with
the Arab civilization) was rediscovered and assimilated on the part of
Christianity.
Thomas Aquinas deemed philosophy to be the prerequisite to faith. Man, in
questioning himself concerning the world, must start from reason, i.e. from
those argumentation theses on which all must agree. It is from this rational
basis that is shared by all men that the first universal results can be
achieved and the groundwork for further theological in-depth study laid.
Thomas Aquinas’ is an appeal, an invitation to go back and start over with
“rational” truths.
                                        
1 P. Pasquino, Political Theory and threat, p. 30, in Political Order, Nomos XXXVIII,
Ed. I. Shapiro and R. Hardin, New York University Press, New York and London,
1993Marco Bifulco
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But why call Thomas Aquinas’ appeal for rationality, tradition? Tradition
no longer represents the practices and the hierarchies of the church (eccle-
siae auctoritas), the conciliar decrees, the Popes’ decretals, but the aucto-
ritas of the great Greek philosophers, with Aristotle’s undisputed leader-
ship. Luther deliberately denounces both “traditions”: the religious tradition
- false and diabolic in such as it did not faithfully reflect the Gospel to the
letter - as well as the philosophic tradition:
“My suggestion would be that the books of Artistotle Physica, Meta-
physica, De Anima, which until now were deemed to be the best, be
abolished together with all the others that speak of natural things,
since nothing can be learned from natural things, nor from spiritual
things”
2.
Not by chance, Francis Bacon, the founder of modern science, will state the
same. To Bacon, Aristotle “reduced many advanced intellects and free
spirits to slavery, was never in any way useful to humanity”
3. The fact is
that the Church, after initial skepticism, made Thomas Aquinas’ doctrine
its own and this explains the common condemnation of the “traditio”.
For Artistotle knowledge arose from the observation of nature. It was a
method quite different from modern empirical science. No experiments
were used and no tools were employed to support the senses; the experi-
ence consisted in immediate sensorial observation. The perception process
was conceived by Artistotle as a prevailingly passive function: the simple
sensation is deemed to always hold true, whereas the judgments we pass on
the perceptive material are considered erroneous.
On this groundwork, Aristotle built a science that starts with perception and
from which the true assumptions can be derived. It is an act of pure rational
intuition: these are inductive truths. Syllogism, applied to these premises,
makes implicit truths explicit.
                                        
2  G. Reale and D. Antiseri, Il Pensiero Occidentale dalle Origini a Oggi 2, Editrice La
Scuola, Brescia, 1983, p. 75
3 ibid. p. 246In search of an Identity for Europe
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The object of observation, nature, is not a casual and disorderly grouping,
that man tries hard to recompose. It is rather an orderly cosmos, the work
of a form of intelligence. It consists not only of “efficient” causes but also
of “final” causes - “The nature of each thing is the goal towards which it
strives”. Causes do not lie outside the objects or in linked events; they are
“internal” causes. The process of procreation of the species is, for example,
an internal agent acting in the thing that produces itself
4. Observing nature
means understanding its purposes - discovering the natural and rational or-
der of things. What can be derived from this, is that the social (natural) or-
der, which is also the object of the philosopher’s observation, is based on a
balance among the inborn inclinations of men (final causes), which are dif-
ferent according to their position within society. The purpose of the slave is
to serve his master, while the head of the family, the citizen has very dif-
ferent duties towards the polis. The task of justice is to give each one his
own (suum cuique tribuere). It defines the order of human society, the dis-
tribution of goods according to the principle of proportional equality, and it
guarantees correct dealings in trade.
The laws set down are inspired by the unwritten principles of nature. It is a
type of work that is eternal - observation does not bestow definitive knowl-
edge on us, but always temporary knowledge. It is nature itself that
changes; “some things are variable by nature”. Law thus derives both from
nature and from conventions which complete the general principles.
Thomas Aquinas brought this view of the world, based on a natural cos-
mologic order, into Christian doctrine, making it coexist with the Christian
God. The lex naturalis becomes part of the lex aeterna (God’s rational plan
known only to the blessed in which man participates - partecipatio legis
aeternae in rationali creatura). Acting according to the natural laws means
being rational and it is typical of man to be inclined to act according to rea-
son. The legislator derives his positive right from the lex naturalis. Conse-
quently, it is essential that human law be inspired by natural law since a
                                        
4 “Potential” expresses a substrate’s predisposition, its potential in taking on a deter-
mined form; the “act” express the full completion of the form in a determined sub-
strate and hence, the essence of the thing.Marco Bifulco
8
human law in conflict with natural law does not exist as a law. It would “no
longer be law, but corruption of law”.
Thomas Aquinas attributes revealed divine law a double task. First of all, it
strengthens our weakened conscience even in those areas that would be ac-
cessible per se to our natural knowledge. It is a confirmation function for
rational truths. But this can’t be all! The specific purpose of divine law is to
instruct us in things concerning our salvation.
Aristotle’s concept of order and natural law, which was taken up by Tho-
mas Aquinas, faced attack from the modernists. Actually its refusal was the
essence of modernity. The concept was offset against both the notions of
subjective law and of legal positivism. This was a process that through
various authors, among whom we find William Ockham, Luther, Calvin
and Cartesius, found its utmost and perfect expression in Hobbes. We need
to retrace this route if we wish to find a substance for “that something
called Europe”. In fact, with the repudiation of natural law (not to be con-
fused with natural rights, of subjective nature), the modern world, through
the Enlightenment, will develop a planning attitude that is not divine, but
human. This became possible only thanks to the progressive erosion of the
doctrine of cosmologic natural law. On the contrary, the goal of this new
planning attitude was precisely liberation and emancipation from an order
that is no longer deemed to be “natural”, but unjust and illegitimate.
William Ockham, called the prince of nominalists, fought strongly against
the thomistic doctrine, as well as against the Roman Church. After a long
period of time spent in prison in Avignon he found refuge under the tempo-
ral power of the Emperor.
Ockham’s world was legal positive. It was a world born of an arbitrary,
creative act, from God’s absolute creative freedom. Recognizing the ra-
tional nature of this act is wrong. It is an act of human arrogance. God’s
will is not at the mercy of human rationality nor is the world structured ac-
cording to necessary relationships that can be discovered through a meta-
physical process.In search of an Identity for Europe
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The attack on thomistic philosophy develops within the dispute on the Uni-
versals
5. What type of existence do the Universals have? For Aristotle indi-
viduals indicate real substances that exist in autonomous and primary form.
The (Universal) predicates express the qualities of substances and their ex-
istence is secondary, in the sense that they exist to the extent in which they
can be autonomously and primarily applied to individuals. Some attributes
express fundamental characteristics, i.e. a belonging to a species. The spe-
cies or form (eidos) defines the essence of substance, the “what that is”
(quod qui est). Logic and science therefore move at the level of species-
essences.
The existence of Univerals makes a cosmologic reconstruction of reality
possible. Entities’ final causes can be discovered. The world and nature
have an intrinsic order; throughout eternity they perpetuate a plan, a design
that is the best, because it is the only one possible.
The relationship between forms, their harmony, is what is studied. The ex-
ternal world is not a chaotic dusting of atoms, it entails a system of classifi-
cation (species essences) that comprises all individuals of nature, a system
of relationships. This is why for Aristotle, law was “suum cuique tribuere”.
Man’s Good is to follow his nature, rationally and freely. The essence of a
thing is thus having to be its own good.
Ockham denied the universals any existence. He defined them as signs and
logic symbols. He transferred the characteristics of being to the conceptual
level. Only individuals exist, the Universals are not characteristics, they are
only generalizations. Thought takes the place of being (here one can begin
to discern the path that idealism will later follow). The world becomes a
grouping of individual elements that have no true links between them in
terms of nature or essence. The entire system of necessary and ordered
causes, that made up the structure of the Platonic and Aristotelian cosmos
yields to a fragmented universe of many isolated individuals.
                                        
5 The Universals are terms that can be predicates for a multitude of other terms. Soc-
rates is an individual because he cannot be the predicate for any subject other than
himself (Socrates is Socrates). Man is an Universal because he is the predicate for
many subjects: Socrates is a man, Aristotle is a man ...Marco Bifulco
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The Church, for example, becomes the aggregation of the multitude of
separate individuals that are the faithful (Ecclesia sunt fideles). The cata-
strophic consequences of this vision are not difficult to see. Hierarchies,
classes, order, and totality disappear. Everywhere, like a sprinkling of dots,
simply individuals; no hierarchy and no order is real.
Consequently, the origins of law can only be traced back to the positive
will of individuals, not to the order of things. Legal positivism is the off-
spring of Nominalism.
The precepts of the decalogue are not natural and therefore, not rationally
valid, but they are mandatory because they are positive; they are God’s
will.
Luther took up and spread this vision of the world, albeit within his doc-
trine. For Luther as well, the source of law is “arbitrary command”. Aris-
totle is “the godless refuge of papists. He is about as close to theology as
darkness is to light. His ethics are the worst enemy of grace”
6.
But God’s word cannot rule the world which is prone to sin. “The world
cannot be ruled according to the Scriptures: God’s word enjoys far too little
respect for that to be possible”
7. Thus reference must be made to the posi-
tive laws promulgated by sovereigns. Nothing sounded sweeter to the ears
of German princes thirsting after sovereignty at the time when states were
being formed.
Hobbes, thanks to his theory of the social contract, presented a more com-
plete version of legal positivism. For Hobbes, in the state of nature, a soci-
ety does not yet exist (for Aristotle society was a state of nature); there are
only individuals with a right to defend themselves. Here, the influence of
Ockham is clear and it is also clear how individualism gave rise to the con-
cept of subjective law.
Individuals are clearly responsible and have a free and rational will of their
own (a universal extension of the characteristics of an elite of enlightened
                                        
6 ibid. p. 78
7 M. Villey, La Formazione del Pensiero Giuridico Moderno, Jaca Book, Milano, p.
258In search of an Identity for Europe
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individuals, an elite to which Hobbes surely felt he belonged). Such indi-
viduals relinquished their right to resist the sovereign and their original
right to all things. There is no real agreement; the liberty of the sovereign
extends as far as the liberty of the subject recedes. It is a government of
responsible men who have chosen. Liberty persists in that which is natural
and therefore inalienable (it cannot be subject to contract): free conscience
and self-defense. We therefore have civil rights limited by law that are ex-
clusive and guaranteed by the State. The Leviathan is created for the indi-
vidual and the social pact is a rational, self-interested calculation of the in-
dividual carried out so that he can assert his natural rights. The sovereign
will rationally abide by the contract for his own convenience.
With Hobbes what I consider the first course of modernity reaches comple-
tion: liberation from tradition, which here stands for that group of thomistic
doctrines accepted by the Catholic Church. It is the course of the “modern
route”, i.e. of a new vision of the world, a radical revolution that, starting
with the Enlightenment, conceives a planning attitude of its own - the fight
against the philosophic and religious tradition turns social in the end. New
forces enter the play thanks to the development of economic capitalism.
Tradition becomes a hazy concept; it changes its appearance throughout the
centuries in a perpetual clash between the new and the old in which the
meanings of terms are deformed as it suits the players. The natural order of
things is denounced by the Enlightenment period as a heap of mistakes,
superstitions, deceptions and falsities, defended only by “aristocracies” that
are steadfast in safeguarding their own privileges. The Aristotelian sciences
themselves prove to be trivial superstitions in the face of the spreading of
the new experimental method. History suddenly accelerates.
The Project
The Enlightenment proved capable of ridiculing the apparent absurdity of
the ancient order. Intellectuals became the voice of the quest for a new
world. But was the human society capable of offering it? The centuries that
followed were characterized by the inability to give man’s society stabilityMarco Bifulco
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in the face of the inexorable decline of the order that had been so arduously
built after the fading of the Roman empire.
Kant defined Enlightenment as that process during which humanity started
using its discretion without subjecting itself to any authority (tradition). In
What is enlightenment? he asked himself if humanity is living in an en-
lightened era: the answer was negative. Kant was nevertheless convinced
he was living in an “enlightening” era.
If it is now asked whether we at present live in a enlightened, the an-
swer is: No, but we do live in an age of enlightenment. As things are
at present, we still have a long way to go before men as a whole can
be in a position (or can even be put into a position) of using their own
understanding confidently and well in religious matters, without out-
side guidance.
8
I underlined “can even be put” in order to highlight the central role intel-
lectuals played during the Enlightenment period. It was the intellectual’s
task to enlighten the public, and, where this was not be possible due to gen-
eral indifference, to enlighten the despot.
Popular enlightenment is the public instruction of the people upon
their duties and rights towards the state to which can be derived from
ordinary common sense, their obvious exponents and interpreters
among the people will not be officials appointed by the state, but free
teachers of right, i.e. the philosophers. The latter, on account of the
very freedom which they allow themselves, are a stumbling-block to
the state, whose only wish is to rule; they are accordingly given the
appellation of ‘enlighteners’, and decried as a menace to the state.
And yet they do not address themselves in familiar tones to the people
(who themselves take little or no notice of them and their writings),
but in respectful tones to the state, which is thereby implored to take a
rightful needs of the people to heart. And if a whole people wishes to
present its grievance (gravamen), the only way to do this is by public-
ity.
9
Kant synthesizes the plan of Enlightenment in one single sentence: to liber-
ate man from a state of minority, a project the intellectuals take on and that
                                        
8 I. Kant, Political Writings, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 58
9 ibid., p. 186In search of an Identity for Europe
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can only be carried out with the collaboration of the State. In order to allow
intellectuals to liberate humanity from its deplorable state Kant asked for
but one thing: freedom of expression. Freedom of expression would have
made the auto-emancipation of intellectuals possible and they, in turn,
would have made the emancipation of the masses possible. The task intel-
lectuals set out to accomplish was that of lifting the “very subtle veil of
mystery”. The mixed English constitution, for example, was in Kant’s eyes
“a mendacious form of publicity [that] deceives the people with the illusion
that the monarchy is limited by a law which emanates from them, while
their representatives, won over by bribery, secretly subject them to an ab-
solute monarch”
10. Evidently quite a distance from Montesquieu.
Freedom of expression would have allowed the beginning of an enlighten-
ing process:
For there will always be a few who think for themselves, even among
those appointed by the guardians of the common mass. Such guardi-
ans, once they have themselves thrown off the yoke of immaturity,
will disseminate the spirit of rational respect for personal value and
for the duty of all men to think for themselves.
11
Kant was by nature cautious, although his thought was bound to enable
much more radical developments. He limited himself to asking for the
“most inoffensive of all liberties”, whilst at the same time, emphasising that
it was the duty of all subjects to obey their sovereign. He always con-
demned any type of rebellion. Acknowledging the right to rebellion would
have led to a permanent, albeit potential, state of revolution.
The ideas of Kant and of the Enlightenment thinkers soon went through
radical transformation. The State and intellectuals would become the two
pillars of a new plan. The drastic social changes that followed the Industrial
Revolution, no longer placed an indifferent audience, but concentrated
masses, at the disposal of the intellectuals. These masses were ready to
fight to claim their right to take a greater part in the economic and political
life of society. At the same time, the State, after the Napoleonic wars, be-
                                        
10 ibid., p. 186
11 ibid., p. 55Marco Bifulco
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came more capable of regulating the civil life of its citizens. This contrib-
uted in creating a suitable climate for the conception of very ambitious
plans.
Denouncing the “falsity” of traditions soon took on an extent that had been
hitherto unthinkable. One no longer fought for religious freedom but for
freedom from religion. The divine, for Feuerbach, was a simple illusion;
the existence of God a representation of humanity’s alienation. Social order
became a conspiracy, to the detriment of the majority, of that enlightened
elite that had given life to the social contract. The contractual nature of or-
der underlined the existence of the “outcast”, of those who didn’t sign and
who inevitably felt betrayed, humiliated and condemned. If man creates his
laws and if there is no natural order of things to be respected, how can the
eschatologic ambitions of intellectuals and the aspirations of the disinher-
ited who are placed in the productive system, be kept at bay? The dizzying
utopia of human emancipation was thus spread, in the awareness of equal-
ity among men. The ambition was to recompose the world that had crum-
bled into a group of individuals in permanent contrast with each other.
Mending this laceration with the help of human discretion, creating an ele-
mentary, rational and unified world in which multiplicity and contradic-
tions would disappear, in which conflicts and differences would dissolve
and law and politics would vanish - all this suddenly becomes a possibility
in man’s development. God’s plan that was to be accomplished at the end
of time is substituted by man’s plan. Humanity takes it upon itself to over-
come its limitations: “Only when[…] the individual man in his empirical
life, in his individual work, in his individual relationships, has become a
member of the human race; only when man has acknowledged and organ-
ized the forces propres as social forces […] only then will human emanci-
pation have been achieved”
12.
The desire to recover the ancient world’s unity is evident. Not harmonious
unity (proportional egalitarism), but total, absolute unity because it comes
forth from the equality of individuals and that can lead to nothing else than
                                        
12 D. Settembrini, Due ipotesi per il socialismo in Marx ed Engels, Laterza, Roma-Bari,
1974, p.5In search of an Identity for Europe
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equality of conditions. Thanks to the rational use of scientific knowledge,
humanity one day will be able to allow all its members to develop their in-
dividual possibilities, achieving the Prometheian dream of capsizing the
hardest of all laws of nature: the one that calls for the subjection of the
weakest to the strongest. The goal is the emancipation from nature itself, a
nature that is contrasted by human culture.
Any other form of social structure would be a conspiracy by the few to the
detriment of the majority. The new aristocracy, the “aristocracy created by
business” [Tocqueville], will prove to be as cruel as the ancient one.
New lies are added to the old; the Enlightenment intellectual’s job is never
done. The objective is no longer Kant’s liberating man from his laziness
and cowardice, from his the lack of decision and courage in making use of
his intellect, it is rather freeing him from material conditions and exploita-
tion. The inspiring principle is an idea of politics based on reason and not
on facts. A type of reason that should not be confused with the sum of
maximising individual reasons nor with the natural reason to which man
can gain access, by reflecting on things. The new type of reason is a crea-
tive act of man and it can change reality. It is an attempt to overcome Ock-
ham’s atomism, giving the Subject a creative value. The Aristotelian and
Platonic forms are recovered, but being thought and not essence they are
acquired by man, taking on movement and therefore, planning capabilities.
In Anglo-Saxon countries, the course taken by Hobbes was developed and
moderated. Attention falls on the need to moderate and control power, lim-
iting the extent of the sovereign’s power of attorney. The Glorious Revolu-
tion gave back the country’s lost social stability, thanks to a compromise
between aristocracy and the emerging bourgeois groups. The existence of
Common law (it too modernized) in which the action of rational agents it-
self creates a spontaneous order, surely facilitated the acceptance of Hob-
bes’ doctrine.
Since law is essentially a discovery process, the juridicial rule will
normally incorporate the rules of behavior which are actually followed
by individuals in their interaction. As well explained by David Hume,
these rules emerge as the result of repeated interaction under differentMarco Bifulco
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circumstances. They are adopted out of many alternative rules tried
because they are those who best serve each individual.
13
Common law is the sum of individuals’ rational and voluntary actions
whose effects are consecrated by law. Natural law is reduced to the natural
rights of atomised individuals (to the life, liberty and to the things they
have procured through their work) who create the law by joint action.
There is no need to overcome Ockham’s atomism, on the contrary, it is ex-
alted as a “natural” and spontaneous order.
The existence of the “rational” man - the combination of an individual, lib-
erty and reason - is the myth of liberalism; an individual who no longer
wishes to discover the essence of things but wants to transform them to
subjugate them. A man of this type must not be protected from manipula-
tion, from deceit and exploitation but from the power of coercion
14, from
the force of violence, the only type of force his reason cannot oppose. The
role of intellectuals, as well as that of the State, is consequently reduced.
The “individuals” are perfectly capable of defending themselves against
external manipulations, of trying to achieve happiness and their emancipa-
tion project their way. There is no longer a need for help from free thinkers,
for the reformation of consciences, but only a need for a government that
leaves civil society live. A position different from that of Kant, for whom a
revolution “will never bring about a real reform in the way of thinking.
New prejudices, similar to the old, will serve the purpose of guiding the
great crowd of those who do not think”
15.
Locke’s philosophy was surely the manifesto of the project of individual
emancipation, an alternative project to that of collective emancipation of
Kantian and Enlightenment inspiration. Man is driven by his desire to be
                                        
13 A. M. Petroni, Who will regulate Internet?, Angelo M. Petroni, Lecture, 1997
14 “There remains a categoric distinction between economy as ‘science of trade’ and
‘science of politics” or ‘politics’. The latter, i.e. politics as an accademic research
discipline, is attributed to the entire sector of non-voluntary relationships among in-
dividuals, those relationships that imply power or coercion.” Quote from J. M. Bu-
chanan, Stato, mercato e libertà, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1989, p. 198
15 I. Kant, Political Writings, p. 55In search of an Identity for Europe
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happy. Happiness is not the realisation of his nature (final cause) as in Ar-
istotle but, empirically, the quest for pleasure and the escape from pain. In
this quest the limit is the natural right of other individuals: “no one shall
cause damage to others’ lives, health, freedom and possessions”. Laws
bring about a system of punishment and reward so as to disincentivate col-
lision among liberties.
But who, if not the individual himself, is the judge of his own pleasure?
Happiness can only be a determination of individual judgment. According
to T. L. Pangles view
“... while humans can agree on the supreme goodness of pleasure, they
cannot agree on which specific modes of pleasure are most intense or
greatest. Indeed “even what they themselves have enjoyed with great
pleasure and delight at one time, has proven insipid or nauseous at an-
other”. From this follows the mortal failing of classical political phi-
losophy: “the mind has a different relish, as well the Palate; and you
will as fruitlessly endeavour to delight all men with Riches ... as you
would to satisfy all Men’s Hunger with Cheese or Lobsters ... hence it
was, I think, that the Philosophers of old did in vain enquire, whether
Summum Bonum consist in Riches, or bodily Delights, or Virtue, or
Contemplation”
16.
Montesquieu, whilst researching the principles that inspire all societies,
was the first to perceive the enormous extent of the Anglo-Saxon cultural
revolution:
Every previous tradition type of civil society can be seen to depend for
its functioning on a particular spring or principle that is the very soul
of each type of civil society: this principle proves on closer examina-
tion to be a specific passion or structure of passions, a veritable
“modification of the soul”, that must be instilled and made to pre-
dominate in the heart of each citizen or subject. In the emerging com-
mercial republic governed by the checks and balances of the separa-
tion of powers, the animating force is of an entirely different kind: “all
the passion being liberated there, the hatred, the envy, the jealousy,
the ardour to enrich and distinguish oneself, would appear in all their
full extent: and if it were otherwise, the State would be like a man
struck down with illness, who has no passions at all because he has no
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power at all”. The new kind of commercial society emerging in Eng-
land and elsewhere is one in which the inhabitants are least coerced,
least “modified” in their souls, least artificially “educated”: “each in-
dividual, always independent, would follow to a great extent his ca-
prices and fantasies”.
17
Individual emancipation is the carrying out of an individual plan, that can-
not be determined a priori. And what is even more important, the project
can be achieved through own, natural means, thanks to the action of indi-
vidual reason.
We therefore have the theoretical and historical co-existence of three pos-
sible worlds, one inspired by natural reason (classic), one inspired by uni-
versal reason (human) and one inspired by individual reason (human).
These three worlds relate to natural order, to the plan for collective eman-
cipation and to the myth of individual emancipation. These are obviously
three ideal types whose action, carries a great deal of relevance in human
conscience even today. The presumed death of ideologies refers only to
their explicit dimension.
Nihilism
After the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars even the supporters
of the ancient order had to call on the modern state (as it had evolved in the
century of Absolutism - Toqueville’s ancien regime), as the sole possible
tutor of order. Once all appeals on natural order (whose instrumental use
had been clearly denounced by the Enlightenment) lost momentum,
nothing but irrationalism remained as the sole source of legitimacy for the
aristocratic order.
Bismarck was surely the political man who had most clearly understood the
meaning of irrationalism as a legitimate source of power:
“How one can live in orderly fashion - do one's share and give each
one his own - without faith in a religion revealed, in a God who wants
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good, in a supreme judge and in a life beyond death, I cannot not
comprehend”.
“If we take this character away from the State, [...] as [...] contrasting
the ideas of Communists, for example, on the immoral character of
property.”
“For in fact, when not to a divine command, why should I subject my-
self to these Hohenzollern? A Swabian family that is not better than
mine and for which I care nothing.”
18
Irrationalism as a political doctrine was already present in Luther
19 who,
from the irrationality of faith, derived the irrationality of political order.
However, in the 1800s, this idea took on a Nihilistic value, due to the (often
implicit) recognition of the relativity of any dogma. The sovereign is he
who decides “on the state of exception, he who is capable of playing intrin-
sic legitimacy against legality, i.e. of using such undetermined concepts as
‘security and political order’, ’danger’, ’state of need’, ’emergency meas-
ures’, ’offenses against the State and the constitution’, ’conciliatory spirit’,
’vital interests’ [...]”
20.
On the Catholic front, De Maistre, the French Restoration philosopher who
was to become the spokesperson of this idea: only a supernatural force can
grant an explanation for Creation and guarantee a stable government.
Prejudice - what else could one call it after the Enlightenment period - be-
came the source of legitimisation of order. De Maistre prescribes that men
should yield to prejudice: prejudice does not reason and national prejudice
is the strongest.
The full recognition of the limitations of man and of the tragic nature of his
existence is the source of inspiration for De Maistre’s extremism (as E. M.
Cioran writes):
Persuaded as they are of the futility of reform, of the vanity and the
heresy of a better solution, reactionaries would like to save human
                                        
18 L. Gall, Bismarck, Rizzoli, Milano, 1982, p. 47-48
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beings from the lacerations and the hardships of hope, from the an-
guish of an illusionary research: they should settle for the acquisition.
They are exhorted to abdicate anxiety in order to abandon themselves
to the sweetness of stagnation, and, opting for an irrevocably official
state of affairs, they should choose between the instinct of self-
preservation and a taste for tragedy
21”.
De Maistre exalts the dogmatism of Catholicism. Of Lutheranism he deni-
grates the admission of free will: “politically, Mohammedanism, Paganism
would have created less damage, had they taken the place of Christianity
with their dogmas and types of faith, since they are religions, something
that Lutheranism is not”
22. In this paragraph De Maistre admits to a relative
concept of dogma. A dogma is a dogma when it is necessary for power.
One can no longer discern whether the object of faith is the Catholic God
or the power He legitimates.
A similar concept of power reveals a penchant towards Nihilism one would
not, at first glance, associate with a champion of militant Catholicism. The
insight that the character of sovereignty is arbitrary in the end (together
with the awareness that man’s efforts to found sovereignty on anything
other than on force amounted to nought) seems to justify the interpretation
of those who, like Carl Schmitt, saw a “decisionist” in Joseph de Maistre, a
supporter of the irrational roots of political authority and its decisions.
Of all misfortunes, Nihilism is surely the worst. In foreign politics it stands
for “politics of power”. The spreading of this principle was, in fact, one of
the main causes of the first world war.
It is not by chance that H. Kissinger in his last essay The art of Diplomacy
concludes that “Bismarck asserted that power supplied its own legiti-
macy
23” and that “driven by such convictions, Bismarck proclaimed the
relativity of all belief, including even the belief in the permanence of his
own country”
24.
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The germ of Nihilism infected all world views, radicalizing and dehuman-
izing them. Such views soon came to show their most tragic, drammatically
violent aspects. Fanaticism is a Nihilist contamination of the original doc-
trine, in which humanity loses all significance and intolerance knows no
limit.
Nihilism also proved to be the extreme and final abandon of “natural law”,
“the enemy is no longer seen as a human being; he lies outside the law
25”.
Nihilism shifted values in such a way that everything was dehumanized. As
the last weapon of an “aristocratic elite” threatened by the masses, after
feeding (itself) on the pain of the material battles of the First World War, it
found its natural development in Totalitarism. In this form one can see the
total loss of equity, that yardstick that manages to model itself according to
the form of the objects it is to measure. It is therefore not the utopia in it-
self, as many argue, that caused the tragedies of the first half of the 20
th
century, but the fact that it had become contaminated with Nihilism. In Ni-
hilism ideologies degenerate into their opposites and this happens because
each doctrine contains infinite germs of disaster.
Even the myth of individual emancipation is not immune to contagion. The
theories of “productivity of low wages” and “Social Darwinism” are clear
examples of the dehumanization of society and the loss of that certain sense
of equity that is at the root of any type of humanism.
Nihilism is “truth becomes king, according to which all the purposes of
being given until now come to fall”
26. This enabled values within ideolo-
gies to be shifted, exalting their rhetoric dimension on one hand, but, on the
other nullifying their essence of which only a feeble semblance remains.
Being is voided of any purpose. What remains is only the “quest for
power”, that is implicit in its existence, a power that requires super-
empowerment. In fact “as soon as power remains still, at a certain degree of
power, it turns into impotence”
27. Heidegger writes:
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[...] power itself, and power alone sets the values, keeps them alive
and decides on its own with regard to the possible justification of a
position based on values. If the whole entity is will power, then what
“has” and “is” a value is only that which fully realizes the power of its
essence. But power is power only as the empowerment of power.
28
The barbarism of Totalitarianisms is no longer inconceivable when seen as
power that constantly searches for its empowerment: “the last purpose of
Totalitarianism - writes Hanna Arendt - is the total domination of man.
Concentration camps are laboratories in which experiments of total domi-
nation are conducted. Human nature being what it is, this goal cannot be
achieved except in the extreme conditions of a hell built by man”
29.
Postmodern Pragmatism
The war against Totalitarianism was the fight against Nihilism. The war
was won, but only in a wider sense. Heidegger in fact notes: “showing Ni-
hilism the door is of no use, because for some time now it has been invisi-
bly roaming around the house”
30. Healing “can only refer to the fatal con-
sequences of the planetary process or to the menacing phenomena that ac-
company it”
31. Man did not rid himself of Nihilism, he only learned to live
with it.
One might ask how we survived such a cataclism? We cannot help being
aware that the Europe of the Thirties was a lost continent. It was from the
Anglo-Saxon culture that the answer to Nihilism sprang forth, or at least in
this culture, resistance was organized. Dewey’s instrumentalism and
Keynes’ “welfare liberalism” played a crucial role. These authors were ca-
pable of finding a way to softly terminate the terrible crisis in which the
European society found itself entangled.
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Dewey’s reflection started from a positive concept of liberty. Liberty did
not mean only freedom from coercion and external conditioning imposed
upon an individual, but is was also positive liberty geared towards achiev-
ing the individual’s own potential: the moral purpose of the individual is
therefore to carry out his function, which consists of an activity in which
his will and his potential are achieved.
If liberty is positive liberty, society should not limit itself to guaranteeing
negative liberty, but allow its members to develop their own liberties. As
an “instrumental” tool, the content of liberty must not be predetermined.
The purpose here is to achieve social purposes through individuals’ efforts.
The success of democracy is due to the better distribution of knowledge
rather than to the redistribution of wealth. There is no desire to change hu-
man nature in doing this. The aim is simply to guarantee potential access to
the common cognitive resources from which the individual can then liber-
ally build its own achievements.
Dewey was convinced that he could exile theology without having to forgo
ethics. This operation was inevitable if the consequences of Nihilism were
to be mitigated, in the hopes of being able to control it. On these grounds
Dewey concluded that human beings' adaptive nature is the foundation of
democratic power.
Ethic action can be naturalistically explained without having to provide a
finalist explanation of universal order. Nature does not have an intrinsic
ethic value but, in the course of its evolution, in and with mankind it has
acquired an ethical dimension. Ethics are therefore the fruit of man’s ad-
aptation to his environment. Knowledge itself is adaptive; it is an interac-
tive process between the individual and the external environment where
problematic realities are reconstructed and reviewed. “Truth” becomes a
means to satisfactorily solve problematic situations.
Contrary to the empirists, Dewey does not conceive experience as a bundle
of sensations. Experience is not the registration of events, nor does it have
exclusively cognitive qualities. Sensations, registrations, and knowledge
are all part of a much wider whole, that is, of the relationship with nature.Marco Bifulco
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Reflective situations have an instrumental character: they are means to
better adapt to nature. Sometimes man and nature can establish a perfect
balance, harmonious unity and perfect integration. But this balance is al-
ways precarious. The world is a scenario of risks; it is full of dangers.
What follows is that not all societies are capable of exploiting their own
growth potential. Democracy finds its own legitimacy in the better ability
to adapt. It can exploit the creative potential of its citizens, guaranteeing the
distribution, albeit neither optimal nor adequate, of cognitive resources.
Values therefore have a historical, not an absolute legitimacy. Each ethic
system is related to the environment in which it formed and for which it
was functional: values are typically human actions; they are plans of action.
Democracy is that way of life in which all mature persons take part in the
process of forming the values that regulate the life of associates; and this
way of life is necessary from the point of view of social good as well as
from that of the full development of human beings as individuals.
According to utilitaristic and atomistic ethics, the object of desire is pleas-
ure (or lack of pain). For Dewey the object of desire is not pleasure but the
purpose one wishes to achieve. We feel pleasure when our goal has been
achieved. Arguing that everyone wants to find happiness does not mean
arguing that everyone wants to feel pleasure. It simply means that all men
want to satisfy their desires. Desires can change, since the agents are not all
equal.
An ethics standard with which to distinguish among good and bad has not
yet been found. In order to find it Dewey calls on the functionalist psychol-
ogy of the end of the 1800s for which pleasure was the realization of the
capabilities of an agent. Happiness is the agreement, prior or following,
among the objective circumstances brought about by our behaviours and
our desires and purposes. According to this view, the ethics standard allows
us to distinguish between real and fake happiness: “We can distinguish
between the false and unsatisfactory happiness found in the expression of a
more or less isolated and superficial tendency of the self, and the true orIn search of an Identity for Europe
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genuine good found in the adequate fulfillment of a fundamental and fully
related capacity”
32.
The Self reaches (true) happiness only in pursuing objectives that can be
included in a co-operative universe. Dewey comes to the conclusion that
social good and the well-being of all those on which the action acts, is the
only good that meets the question of the Self with a purpose that is com-
prehensive and in expansion. The human ego is intrinsically social, linked
to other “Selves” by instinctive social affections and such sympathetic af-
fections make others’ good the object of desire and behavior. “Hence we
cannot separate the idea of ourselves and our own good from our idea of
others and of their good”
33.
Society is the reference point for individual action, but the latter, in democ-
racies is free because it is adaptive.
The aristocratic idea implies that the mass of men are to be inserted by
wisdom, or, if necessary, thrust by force, into their proper positions in
the social organism. It is true, indeed, that when an individual has
found that place in society for which he is the best fit and is exercising
the function proper to that place, he has obtained his completest de-
velopment, but it is also true (and this is the truth omitted by aristoc-
racy, emphasized by democracy) that he must find this place and as-
sume this work in the main for himself.
34
It is clear how Dewey assimilated Aristotelic tradition in a biological con-
text. Biological reason takes the place of natural reason. Just as in Aristotle
the supreme good achievable by man (happiness) consists in perfecting
oneself as a human being, i.e. in that activity that differentiates man from
all other things. But happiness is attainable only within the human commu-
nity.
Dewey gave a first answer to Nihilism which, after the First World War,
led the European continent to its downfall:
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When interest in power is permeated with an affectionate impulse it is
protected from being a tendency to dominate and tyrannize; it be-
comes an interest in effectiveness of regard for common ends.
35
His thought can be placed in an intermediate position between the indi-
vidualistic liberalism of old and socialism. It helped determine that turn in
American politics called the “New Deal”, an adaptive project that took its
form and consensus from the failure of the American Laissez-faire of the
Twenties.
With Dewey, the human project lost its utopic dimension to become neces-
sary adaptation and, therefore, a constant search for improvement. Dewey
was decidedly against utopian philosphers, aware as he was that utopia
normally generates skepticism and fanatism, both closely related to Nihil-
ism. Adapting means setting concrete goals, aiming not for remote destina-
tions but for those closer at hand, achievable in the actual historical condi-
tions.
Keynes himself seems to take inspiration from adaptive reason when he
asks the State to intervene directly in the economy. This is deemed neces-
sary in order to recreate a social balance, where society is threatened by an
unemployment rate as high as never before. State intervention does not aim
to implement a “plan for history”, but is relative to historical and social cir-
cumstances:
It is certain that the world will not much longer tolerate the unem-
ployment which, apart from brief intervals of excitement, is associated
- and, in my opinion, inevitably associated - with present day-day
capitalistic individualism.
36
Keynes, in “The end of Laissez-Faire”, concludes that “our problem is to
work out a social organisation which shall be as efficient as possible with-
out offending our notions of a satisfactory way of life”
37. He denies the ex-
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istence of a pact or contract conferring perpetual rights to those who own or
purchase goods and the existence of “natural liberty” for individuals’ eco-
nomic activities.
This does not mean that Keynes was against individual liberty; if anything
he recognized its instrumental and non-aprioristic character:
But, above all, individualism, if it can be purged of its defects and its
abuses, is the best safeguard of personal liberty in the sense that, com-
pared with any other system, it greatly widens the field for the exer-
cise of personal choice. It is also the best safeguard of the variety of
life, which emerges precisely from this extended field of personal
choice, and the loss of which is the greatest of all the losses of the
homogeneous or totalitarian state. For this variety preserves the tradi-
tions which embody the most secure and successful choices of former
generations; it colours the present with the diversification of its fancy;
and, being the handmaid of experiment as well as of tradition and of
fancy, it is the most powerful instrument to better the future.
38
The expansion of governmental functions was for Keynes “the only practi-
cable means of avoiding the destruction of existing economic forms”
39.
Keynes' argumentation theses do not differ too much from those of Dewey.
Adaptation becomes “to work out a social organisation which shall be as
efficient as possible”. This should guarantee, or better, exalt the individual,
“the most powerful instrument”, when sided by government intervention.
There is, however, a typically English note of sarcasm: “To suggest social
action for the public good to the City of London is like discussing the Ori-
gin of Species with a bishop sixty years ago”
40.
Europe, today
Our excursus draws to a close. It was a circular route in which man
returned to nature, a nature that was no longer static, but in movement,
dynamic; where human work is the last stage of the evolution that acquires
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its own autonomous meaning with man. The views presented are still alive
in consciences today; all - some more, some less - influence the identity of
European citizens who freely recognize themselves in them. These views
are ideal types, and each individual vision of reality is contaminated by
them. Each one of us can, for “play”, try to recognize himself in one of the
visions presented in the framework of this historical-philosophical recon-
struction. There is only one vision I feel inclined to explicitly condemn: the
“vision of nothing”, which, due to the power delirium it bears, is not to be
confused with an agnostic and skeptic essay.
Believing in the existence of one European identity means wanting to im-
pose it. The “European something” thus proves to be - how could it be oth-
erwise? - pluralism. Europe’s citizens will make their choices for the 21
st
century. The amateur can only appeal to the sense of equity, “a form of
justice that goes beyond what has been written down as law”
41, the only
protection against every kind of dehumanization of the most humane of all
ideologies.“Not of today or yesterday they are, but lives eternal: no one can
date its birth.“
42
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